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ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom assumes that homeownership is risky because house prices are
volatile. But all households start life “short” housing services, and homeownership could be a less
risky way of obtaining those services than the alternative, renting. While a renter faces year-toyear fluctuations in rent, a homeowner receives a guaranteed flow of housing services at a known
price, and so is hedged against rent risk. Although the homeowner is in turn exposed to asset price
risk when she sells her house, that risk can be relatively small since it arrives at the end of the stay
in the house and so is discounted, or it is deferred even later if the homeowner moves to a
correlated housing market. We show in a stylized model with endogenous house prices that rent
risk can indeed outweigh asset price risk. The net benefit of homeownership increases in the
owner’s expected horizon in the home, as the number of rent risks avoided rises and the asset price
risk occurs later in time. This effect of horizon on the demand for owning should increase
multiplicatively with the magnitude of the volatility of rents. Another implication of our analysis is
that the aggregate wealth effect from fluctuations in house prices may be small since higher prices
are generally offset by equivalent increases in the expected cost of future housing services.
We test these implications using MSA-level data on house prices and rent volatility
matched with CPS data on homeownership. Consistent with the model, the difference in the
probability of homeownership between households with long and short expected horizons in their
residences is 2.9 to 5.4 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent
variance MSAs. The sensitivity to rent risk is greatest for households that exogenously must
devote a larger share of their budgets to housing. Similarly, the “younger” elderly who live in high
rent variance MSAs are more likely to own their own homes on average, but their probability of
homeownership falls faster as they approach the end of life and their horizon shortens. Finally, we
find that the house price-to-rent ratio capitalizes not only expected future rents, but also the
associated rent risk premia, consistent with asset pricing models. At the MSA level, a one standard
deviation increase in rent variance increases the house price-to-rent ratio by 2 to 4 percent.
Keywords: house prices, house price risk, rent risk, housing tenure choice, household risk
management, aging and housing wealth
JEL codes: R21, E21, G11, G12, J14

According to the 2000 Decennial Census, 68 percent of U.S. households own the house
they live in. Those households commit a substantial portion of their net worth to their house, 27
percent on average [Poterba and Samwick (1997)]. For households with heads aged 65 and over,
housing wealth comprises 45 percent of their non-Social Security wealth. Conventional wisdom
holds that this substantial, undiversified exposure to real estate assets makes home owning quite
risky, since fluctuations in house prices can have a sizeable effect on households’ financial net
worth.
In this paper we demonstrate that homeownership is less risky than conventionally
assumed. The starting point of our analysis is that households are in effect born “short” housing
services, since they have to live somewhere. They must make up this housing deficit in some way.
The key question is whether it is better to procure their desired housing services by renting or by
owning. Renters are subject to annual fluctuations in rent, which is the spot price of housing
services. Since housing costs are the largest component of most households’ budgets, representing
on average about a third of annual income, and market rents can be quite volatile (with an average
standard deviation of 2.9 percentage points per year), this rent risk can be substantial.
By contrast, a homeowner locks in the cost of future housing services by paying a known
up-front price for a house that delivers a guaranteed stream of housing services. Buying a house is
akin to purchasing a security that pays out annual dividends equal to the spot rent. Thus
homeownership provides a hedge against fluctuations in the cost of housing services: if rents
increase, the security pays just enough more to make up the difference. In practice this hedge is
available only by owning. Long-term rent contracts are rare in the U.S.: Genesove (1999) reports
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that 97.7 percent of all residential leases are for terms of one year or less. Also, one cannot
purchase a “rent swap” to exchange variable rents for fixed rents.1
In exchange for avoiding rent risk, the homeowner faces asset price risk when he moves (or
dies) and sells the house. However, this risk can be low. The key reason that there is any asset price
risk at all is that houses “outlive” their owners. That is, the hedges provided by houses last longer
than their owners’ need to satisfy their short positions in housing services while avoiding rent risk.
If residence spells were infinite (or in a dynastic setting, if descendents live in the same houses as
their parents), homeownership would not be risky at all, since there would be no sale price risk.
Even with a finite horizon, a household’s effective residence spell is longer than its actual one if it
moves within the same or correlated housing markets.
This analysis also implies that the aggregate wealth effect from fluctuations in house prices
may be relatively small. For example, in our framework an increase in house prices occurs because
the expected present value of spot rents has risen (assuming no change in risk premia or discount
rates). This implies that households’ short positions in housing services have become more
expensive to fulfill. Hence increases in house prices that raise the net worth of current
homeowners would generally be accompanied by a potentially offsetting decline in the effective
wealth of renters and future homeowners. Moreover, every housing transaction is just a transfer
between a buyer and a seller, and so tends to wash out in the aggregate.
Of course, homeownership does not strictly dominate renting. Households must trade off
the rent insurance benefit of owning against its asset price risk. We illustrate this tradeoff with a
stylized model of tenure choice in the presence of both rent risk and house price risk. Since house
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We can only speculate as to why more rent-insurance contracts do not exist. One possibility is that the necessary
contracting is difficult. For example, presumably a swap would have to terminate if one party moved. But if rents fell
and the renter owed a sufficient amount of money on his half of the swap, he would simply move and exit the contract.
In addition, it may be expensive to put such a swap in place for a long term.
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prices endogenously capitalize the discounted value of future rents, the asset price risk increases
with rent risk. Which risk dominates on net is largely determined by households’ expected length
of stay (horizon) in their houses. For households with short horizons, the asset price risk is more
likely to dominate, since there are few opportunities for rents to fluctuate and the asset price risk
comes early in time. But households with longer horizons experience a greater number of rent
fluctuations and the asset price risk comes later in time and so is more heavily discounted. For
these households the rent risk can outweigh the asset price risk, and so on net increase the demand
for owning. The magnitude of the difference between rent risk and asset price risk increases with
the volatility of rents. Hence greater rent volatility increases the rate at which the net rent risk and
demand for owning increase with horizon – an implication that we exploit in our empirical
analysis.
The model also shows the implications of housing costs being correlated across location
and time, by allowing for households to move across locations. Greater cross-sectional correlation
in rents (and endogenously, in house prices) across current and future housing markets reduces the
effective magnitude of asset price risk because the sale and purchase prices are more likely to
offset. Even if the price of the future house is cross-sectionally uncorrelated with the price of the
current house, to the degree that house prices are persistent over time, the purchase price of the
future house is partially hedged by its own subsequent sale price, which also reduces total asset
price risk.
In contrast, the previous literature on housing tenure choice has largely ignored the tradeoff
between the rent and asset price risks. Indeed, most studies neglect risk altogether and compute a
deterministic user cost of housing.2 On the other hand, some recent contributions to the portfolio
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The traditional user cost literature, e.g. Rosen (1979), Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), and Poterba (1984), estimates
housing demand as a function of just expected returns on housing. We know of only a few studies that consider rent
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choice literature have modeled the demand for owning real estate assets, but they generally
consider the associated asset price risk in isolation, neglecting the tenure decision and the riskiness
of renting. Instead they focus on various costs of the asset price risk, such as the resulting
distortions to homeowners’ saving and consumption behavior [Engelhardt (1996), Skinner (1989)],
or to their financial portfolio allocations [Brueckner (1997), Flavin and Nakagawa (2003), Flavin
and Yamashita (1998), Fratantoni (1997), and Goetzmann (1993)]. 3 Hence this paper can be seen
as extending the existing literatures to account for a central but understudied element of household
risk management.4 Our framework bears some similarities to term-structure models of long versus
short duration bonds, in which holding a long bond provides insurance against fluctuations in short
interest rates.
Depending on the elasticity of supply of owned housing units, the insurance demand for
home owning may show up in a higher homeownership rate, higher house prices, or both. In an
elastically supplied market, the additional demand for ownership that is due to net rent risk will be
reflected in a greater probability of home owning. In an inelastic market, house prices will be bid
up by the marginal homebuyer until they capitalize not only the discounted value of expected
risk. In a time series study, Rosen et al. (1984) finds that one predictor of the aggregate homeownership rate is the
difference between the unforecastable volatility of the user cost of homeownership and rents. They assume that rental
housing and owner-occupied housing are independent goods, so they do not allow for an endogenous relation between
house prices and rent. In Henderson and Ioannides (1983), the rent risk is to the landlord, not the tenant. In their
model, the tenant may not properly care for the property. This incentive compatibility problem raises the average rent
for renters but does not involve rent volatility. Ben-Shahar (1998) reverses the usual models by including uncertainty
about rents but exogenous and riskless house prices. Thus there is no trade-off between rent and price risk in his model.
In work subsequent to this paper, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) develop an extended version of our framework that
examines the implications of the covariance between rents and earnings.
3
Skinner (1989) and Summers (1983) consider the asset price risk of the house, but not the value of housing as
insurance against rent fluctuations. Davidoff (2003) measures asset price risk by how much house prices covary with
labor income, and is primarily concerned with the effect of asset price risk on the amount of housing purchased in a
portfolio context. He assumes exogenous house prices and does not consider the tradeoff with rent risk.
4
Other papers investigate alternative sources of household risk. Cocco (2000) and Haurin (1991) investigate the
effects of income risk on housing portfolio choice. Cocco also includes interest rate risk, in a parameterized structural
model of housing investment, but he rules out the possibility of renting. Campbell and Cocco (2003) use the
covariance of income, interest rates, and house prices to explain whether people finance their house with fixed or
floating rate debt. However, their financing decision does not involve the tradeoff between rent expenditures and asset
price risk. Other work emphasizes the negative effects of depressed house prices and housing equity on household
mobility [Chan (2001), Genesove and Mayer (1997), Stein (1995)].
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future rents, but also the risk premia associated with the net rent risk. In such a market, the priceto-rent ratio should rise with rent volatility. We test these implications empirically, using data on
both homeownership rates and house prices. Overall we find that the tradeoff between rent risk and
house price risk affects households’ behavior in ways consistent with our model.
When we use household-level data on homeownership, our empirical strategy exploits the
implication that the effect of expected horizon on the demand for homeownership should increase
with rent volatility. To isolate the effect of net rent risk from other reasons why households might
own their houses, we control for both Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and individual
heterogeneity, and compare the difference in the probability of homeownership for exogenously
long- and short-horizon households, to see if this difference increases with rent volatility.5 In
particular, we separately control for the rent variance in households’ MSAs and for their expected
horizons, and then focus on the interaction of the rent variance with the horizon. The interaction
term nets out the effect of unobserved factors like moving costs that might contaminate the direct
relationship between homeownership and expected horizon.
Using household-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) matched to MSAlevel rent data, we find that the estimated effect of rent risk on the probability of homeownership is
small for households with average expected horizons, but substantially increases for households
with longer horizons, consistent with our model. The difference between the likelihood of
homeownership for a household with above-the-median expected horizon and that of a below-themedian household is up to 5.4 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low
rent variance MSAs. We also find evidence that the sensitivity to rent risk is greater for households
that face a bigger housing gamble, and so might be effectively more risk averse, because typical
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For example, homeownership can vary with income, demographics and tax benefits [Rosen (1979)], inflation
[Summers (1981)], and the agency costs of renting [Henderson and Ioannides (1983)].
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rents in their MSA comprise a relatively large portion of their annual income. Among such
households, those with long expected horizons are the most responsive to net rent risk, having a 6.1
percentage point higher probability of homeownership relative to other households if they live in a
MSA with high rent variance.
The rent insurance benefit of owning is particularly large for the elderly. The “younger”
elderly in markets with high rent volatility are more likely to own their homes, consistent with their
being generally more risk averse than the marginal homebuyer. All else equal, a household with a
head who is 60 years old is 10.1 percentage points more likely to own its home if it lives in a
market in the top quartile of rent variance (a level effect). But after age 65 or so, the probability of
homeownership begins to decline with age, and more steeply in high rent variance markets. This
slope effect is also consistent with our model, because as the end of life approaches, the rent
insurance becomes less valuable as the number of periods for which a homeowner expects to be
insured against rent risk falls, and the asset price risk is closer at hand. Thus the rent insurance
benefit of homeownership may provide a partial explanation for the failure of the elderly to transit
out of homeownership at as early an age as traditional life-cycle models predict [Venti and Wise
(2000); Megbolugbe, et al (1997)].
Unless the supply of owned housing is perfectly elastic, the extra demand for home owning
due to rent risk also should be capitalized into house prices. We measure the additional value to
owning rather than renting by comparing house prices relative to rents. The price-to-rent ratio for
houses is analogous to the price-earnings ratio for stocks. Using MSA-level data, we find that
house prices do indeed incorporate a premium for avoiding net rent risk. We also find that the
price-to-rent ratio increases with expected future rents, just as a price-earnings ratio should increase
with expected future earnings. These results are consistent with our model and other asset-pricing
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models of financial assets. At the MSA level, a one standard deviation increase in rent variance
raises the average price-to-rent ratio in a market from 15.7 to as much as 16.3. Holding rents
constant, this corresponds to a 2 to 4 percent increase in house prices.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section I, we present a stylized model
of tenure choice in the presence of both rent risk and house price risk. Section II describes our data
sources and variable construction. The empirical methodology and results are reported in section
III. Section IV briefly concludes.

I.

A simple model of the insurance benefit of owner-occupied housing
This section presents a simple model of tenure choice in which the cost of securing housing

services is uncertain and house prices are endogenous. The model is stylized in order to highlight
certain key tradeoffs between the risks of renting versus those of home owning, so we make a
number of simplifying assumptions. Consider a representative, risk-averse household that lives for
N years, labeled 0 through N-1, after which it dies. To begin with, suppose the household lives in
only one residence, making a single tenure decision at birth in year 0. (We will later consider the
additional effects if households can move after some time to another location, with housing costs
possibly correlated across locations.) For convenience rental units and owner-occupied houses
provide the same flow of housing services.6 The household chooses at birth its desired quantity of
housing services, normalized to be one unit, which it cannot change during its lifetime. Assuming
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Equivalently, the household can be thought of as choosing between owning and renting the same house. The
comparative statics below can be generalized to allow the services from the owner-occupied house to exceed those
from renting, perhaps due to agency problems. In practice rent risk might also reduce the desired size of rental space
(the intensive margin). While this effect is consistent with the insurance motives under investigation, here it would
make it more difficult to find an effect on the rent versus own (extensive) margin that we analyze empirically. Hence
our results will provide a lower bound for the full importance of the rent insurance motive.
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perfect capital markets and known, exogenous lifetime wealth, the household’s tenure choice will
maximize the expected utility of its wealth net of its housing costs.7,8
The household will accordingly compare the risk-adjusted costs of renting versus owning.
Renting is akin to paying for housing services on a spot market. Spot rents fluctuate year to year
due to exogenous shocks to the underlying local economy and housing market.9 Suppose these
rents can be described as following a general AR(1) process: rt = µ + ϕrt−1 + ηt, where φ∈[0,1]
measures the degree of persistence in rents, µ measures the expected level or growth rate of rents
(depending on φ), and the shocks η to rents are distributed IID(0,σ2).10
Because there are no capital market imperfections, ex post households care only about their
total housing costs. Initially, when choosing whether to rent or own, they project forward to the
ends of their lives and forecast how much they will have spent ex post on housing under each
7

Relaxing these assumptions would be complex and not add to our basic insights concerning rent and price risk.
Davidoff (2003) finds that the correlation of rents with income could further affect the relative riskiness of renting. In
preliminary analysis, we controlled for this type of correlation in our empirical work and found that it does not affect
our primary results. The model in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002) allows heterogeneous households to make
intermediate changes in tenure.
8
If the household has a bequest motive, fluctuations in its housing costs lead to uncertainty in the value of its bequest.
Hence the household will still want to consider asset price risk when minimizing the risk-adjusted costs of fulfilling its
desire for housing services. The two-location extension below applies if the children use the bequest to buy their own
house. A partial bequest motive, where the parents do not value their children’s utility as highly as their own, would
lead to a partial reduction in the cost to the parent of the terminal asset price risk.
9
Changes in the spot rent are generated by variation in the demand for housing services. Any number of local
economic conditions fluctuate over time and across space, from the success of locally concentrated industries that
raises workers’ wages to increased immigration or in-migration leading to a larger population. Of course, changes in
demand do not necessarily get capitalized into rents. If housing is perfectly elastically supplied, rents are set by
construction costs, and greater demand would lead to more housing units, not higher prices. If housing is at least
partially inelastically supplied -- perhaps due to zoning, a limited supply of land, time lags in construction, or (when
demand falls) an existing durable housing stock (see Glaeser and Gyourko, (2004)) -- then some portion of the changes
in demand would show up in rents. As supply becomes more inelastic, underlying demand volatility will have an
increasingly large effect on the volatility of rents. In an earlier version of this paper, we found that rent volatility is a
function of underlying volatility in the unemployment rate interacted with the inelasticity of supply of housing in the
local market (proxied by regulatory constraints on building). These results used cross-MSA variation, however, which
is only suggestive, given potential MSA-level heterogeneity.
10
We take the spot rent process as given, without modeling its underlying determinants. Whatever the ultimate
determinants, the model correctly specifies the endogenous relationship that results between rents and house prices.
This approach is analogous to other asset-pricing models. For instance, in term structure models of long versus short
maturity bonds, the process for short rates (analogous to our rental rates) is the exogenous input into the model. In
models of stock prices, the input is the process for firm cash flows, and the stochastic price of a stock at sale is
analogous to our house sale price.
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tenure option; and they evaluate the corresponding ex ante expected utilities. For renters, the ex
N −1

rt R ( N −1) −t ) ≡ CR RN-1,
post total cost of renting, discounted to the final year N-1, is ( r0 R N −1 + ∑ ~
t =1

where R is the gross interest rate, for simplicity a constant, and CR is the total cost of renting,
discounted back to year 0. The initial rent r0 is observed at the time of the tenure decision at time
0, but the future rents are unknown. (The tildes identify stochastic variables as of time 0.) It will be
convenient below to discount all values back to the initial year 0 using the discount factor δ ≡ 1/R.
Then the (ex post) utility of being a renter, UR, can be simply expressed as a function of the present
value of lifetime wealth W less the present discounted cost CR of the rents that are paid:
N −1


U R = U (W − C R ) = U W − r0 − ∑ δ t ~
rt  .
t =1



The household can avoid the uncertainty of the future rents by buying its residence in year
0. The house is like a security that pays out in perpetuity annual dividends equal to the spot rent,
thus providing a hedge against rent risk. However, while the initial purchase price P0 is observed
(and will be determined in equilibrium below), the sale price PN is stochastic. Since house prices
will endogenously capitalize future rents, the sale price will fluctuate with the rent shocks. This
exposes the homeowner to asset price risk at the end of life when he sells the house.11 Hence the
~
(ex post) cost of owning, again discounted back to year 0, is Co ≡ P0 − δ N PN , the difference

between the purchase price of the house and the discounted proceeds from the subsequent sale of

11

We assume a stationary economy with a sequence of representative households owning and renting a fixed supply of
housing and rental units. For consistency, the sale to the next generation is assumed to take place at the beginning of
year N, with PN determined when rN is observed, etc.
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the house.12 The utility of being an owner, UO, is just a function of lifetime wealth less the
discounted cost Co: U O =

(

)

~
U (W − CO ) = U W − P0 + β N PN .

We assume that in equilibrium house prices are endogenously determined such that
households are ex ante indifferent between owning and renting, with E0 UO = E0 UR, so that both
owned and rented housing units are occupied. In our model, which implicitly assumes a fixed
supply of housing, the equilibrium house price P0 can be used to measure the demand for owning
relative to renting. Of course, the extent to which demand is empirically capitalized into house
prices depends on the elasticity of supply. We will return to this distinction later.
Under the above assumptions one can show that the equilibrium house price takes the
following form:
P0 =

PV (r0 , µ ) +

π R (σ 2 , N ) − π O (σ 2 , N )
1−δ N

(1)

The house price is the sum of two terms: the present value of expected rents, PV, plus the net risk
premium, which consists of the difference between the risk premium associated with renting, π R ,
and the risk premium associated with owning, π O .13 We discuss each of these components in turn.

12

For simplicity we abstract from other factors that affect homeownership and rental costs, such as the tax treatment of
homeownership, maintenance, and depreciation. Such factors may affect the relative cost of owning and renting, but
they will not qualitatively change the comparative statics at issue here regarding the effects of increases in rent
volatility. For example, since interest rates are nearly equal across the country and depreciation schedules are set at the
federal level, variation in them over time will not affect our cross-sectional results. Property taxes are incorporated in
rents and thus do not differ between owners and renters. Owners have a great degree of flexibility over the timing of
maintenance costs, which mitigates their short-run risk; and their long-run maintenance expenditure should be
relatively predictable [Gyourko and Tracy (2004)]. Landlords pass along maintenance costs for renters, and thus the
maintenance risk is properly measured in our estimate of rent variance. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) argue that taxes
provide some risk sharing between homeowners and the government. We will control for tax regime changes over
time in the empirical work.
13
In short, to solve the model we equate the certainty-equivalent utilities of renting and owning, UR( W -E0CR(r0,µ) πR(η1,η2,..,ηN-1) ) = UO( W -E0CO(P0,r0,µ) - πO(η1,η2,..,ηN) ), after recursively expressing each rent rt as a function of r0,
µ, and the shocks η1 to ηt that arise after year 0: rt = ϕtr0 + µΣi=1tϕi-1 + Σi=1tϕt-iηi. As explained below, the price PN can
be expressed as a function of rN and so recursively also as a function of r0,µ, and η1 to ηN. From this equation we solve
for the house price P0 = P0(r0,µ, πR-πO).
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The PV term reflects the observation that the value of a house reflects the value of the
housing services that it provides, which is akin to paying out the spot rents:
PV (r0 , µ ) =

δ 
1 

 r0 + µ
(1 − δ ) 
1 − δϕ 

(2)

The value of these payments is greater than the current rent r0; the second term in the parentheses
captures the expected present value of the future rents, which depend on µ, in perpetuity.14 Just as
a price-earnings ratio increases with expected future earnings, the difference between the house
price and the current rent will increase with expected future rents. The factor (1/[1-δϕ]) >1 reflects
the persistence of rents: with φ>0, each increase in rent continues to augment the rents in
subsequent periods.

π R measures the risk associated with renting. It is the risk premium that would leave the
N −1

rt ), which is
household indifferent between paying the discounted cost of renting CR (= r0 + ∑ δ t ~
t =1

stochastic, versus paying its expected value E0 CR and the premium. This premium can be
approximated as:

π R (σ , N ) =
2

α

2

N −1


σ ∑  δ n + ∑ δ iϕ i − n  ,
2
n =1 
i = n +1

2

N −1

(3)

where α measures household risk-aversion. To interpret this result, note that the outer summation
corresponds to the N-1 rent shocks η1 to ηN-1 that are avoided by owning, with the later shocks
discounted more heavily (using δn). The inner summation reflects the fact that if ϕ>0, each shock
continues to affect rents in subsequent periods, in proportion to its persistence ϕ. For instance, if
the rent shocks are IID, with ϕ=0, then the inner summation disappears and π R is simply equal to

14

This is true even when the households’ horizon N is finite, since when each household sells the house, the sale price
will in turn reflect the value of the subsequent rents, appropriately discounted.
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(α/2)*σ2 Σn=1N-1(δn)2 = (α/2)*σ2 [δ2 + δ 4+…+ δ (N-1)2]. Note that π R increases with both N, the
number of rent shocks the renter faces, and with σ2, the magnitude of the rent shocks. Because
owning provides the benefit of avoiding the rent shocks, their corresponding risk premia get bid
into house prices, so π R enters equation (1) with a positive sign. This has the important implication
that rent risk tends to increase the demand for home owning, ceteris paribus.
The risk premium π O measures the risk associated with the discounted cost of owning Co
~
(= P0 − δ N PN ), due to the stochastic sale price PN:

α

2

N −1
 δN 
 ( 1 + ∑ ϕ 2i )
π O (σ , N ) = σ 
2
i =1
 1 − δϕ 
2

2

(4)

Equations (1) and (2) imply that house prices can be expressed as a linear function of
contemporaneous rents, and so house prices endogenously inherit the riskiness of the rent process.
Hence the sale price PN will vary with the contemporaneous rent shock ηN and, if rents are
persistent, with the previous shocks η1 to ηN-1 as well. The summation term in equation (4) reflects
the effect of these previous shocks when φ>0. Further, as the volatility of rents σ2 increases, the
sale price PN becomes increasingly risky. For instance, if rents are IID with φ=0, then the
summation term disappears because the previous shocks do not affect PN, and so π O is simply
equal to (α/2)*σ2(δN)2. In this case the sale price risk is of the same magnitude as the individual
rent risks, but discounted using δN since the sale price is realized N years after purchase. However,
as the rent shocks become more persistent as φ increases, the sale price risk increases. More of the
prior rent shocks accumulate and are embedded into the sale price, increasing the magnitude of the
summation term. For instance, if rent shocks are fully persistent, with φ=1, then π O equals
(α/2)*Nσ2[δN/(1-δ)]2. (This is greater than (α/2)*σ2(δN)2 under φ=0, since all N rent shocks η1 to
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ηN get fully reflected in the sale price.) π O enters equation (1) with a negative sign, so unlike rent
risk the asset price risk reduces the demand for owner-occupied housing, ceteris paribus.
Returning to equation (1), note that if the spot rents are riskless (σ2 =0) or if households are
risk neutral (α=0), then the house price P0 reflects only the expected rental costs in the PV term, as
in Poterba (1984). Otherwise, the house price also reflects the net risk premium associated with
renting relative to owning, π R - π O . Since both owning and renting are risky, the tenure decision
must consider the tradeoff between the two risky options, rather than either option in isolation. If
the sign of the net risk premium is positive, renting is riskier on balance than owning, and so the
house price P0 would be greater than the PV term. That is, risk averse households would bid up the
house price because of the hedging benefit that the house provides against rent risk. Moreover,
since the net risk premium is proportional to the volatility of rents σ2, the house price would then
increase with σ2, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if the sign of the net risk premium is negative,
owning is riskier on balance than renting, and then the house price would decrease with σ2.
For example, in the IID case (φ=0) equation (1) implies that the price-to-rent differential,
which is a convenient way to normalize prices, can be written as follows:
P0 − r0 =

µ

δ
1− δ

+

α
2



 N −1

1 

N
 1 − δ 

σ 2  ∑ δ 2 n − δ 2 N 
 n =1

(5)

In the square brackets the net risk premium includes N-1 positive premia for the rent shocks η1 to
ηN-1 that are avoided by owning the house, minus one premium for the sale price risk due to PN, all
appropriately discounted. Thus the net risk premium depends on N, the household’s expected
horizon in the residence. As N increases, the renter faces more rent shocks, which increases the
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rent risk-premium π R ; whereas the sale price risk comes later in time, and is thus discounted more
heavily, which reduces the risk premium for owning π O .
In this IID case, because the house price risk is of the same magnitude as the individual rent
risks but discounted more heavily, the rent risks dominate and the net risk premium is necessarily
positive for any N. In this case the price-rent differential would unambiguously increase with σ2.
In contrast, as rent shocks become more persistent (with ϕ>0), the sale price risk increases in
magnitude. Even though π R also increases with φ, π O can increase by even more, so it is possible
that the sale price risk outweighs the rent risks for small N, making the net risk premium negative.
For large N the net risk-premium tends to be positive, with renting being riskier than owning. For
intermediate levels of N, the net risk premium can be small and of either sign. Hence, the average
effect of rent risk σ2 on house prices is theoretically ambiguous in sign, depending on the horizon
of the marginal household, and possibly small in magnitude.15 Nevertheless, whichever risk
dominates on average, the net rent risk increases with N.
Another factor affects house prices in equilibrium. In equation (1) the term (1/[1-δN]) >1
multiplying the net risk premium reflects the fact that the sale price PN will also incorporate the net
risk premium (to leave future owners indifferent between owning and renting) and, to compensate,
this premium is recursively embedded into the initial purchase price P0. For instance, if the net risk
premium is positive, thus raising PN, in equilibrium P0 must also be increased sufficiently to keep
the initial owner indifferent between renting and owning, taking into account that he will later sell
at PN and recoup the net risk premium, albeit at a discount. Note that the factor 1/[1-δN] declines

15

Case and Shiller (1989) find that changes in house prices exhibit some persistence. That can be explained in our
framework if rents are not random walks. In our annual, MSA-level rent data φ is about 0.6-0.7. In this case, using a
discount factor of δ = 0.94, the net risk premium in this stylized model is positive so long as the horizon N is greater
than 3 to 4 years.
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with N: the later the premium in the sale price PN is recouped, the less valuable it is, and so the
smaller need be the compensating effect on P0.16
This effect complicates the overall impact of the horizon N on the house price, which works
through the term (πR - πO) /(1-δN) in equation (1). As N increases, the net risk premium in the
numerator of this term increases, but the denominator also increases. For φ=1 the entire term is
monotonically increasing in N, but for φ<1 it can be non-monotonic in N. For empirically
reasonable values of around φ=0.7 and δ=0.94, the term rises steeply with N for N=2-20 years, then
slightly declines and plateaus. That is, for horizons of up to 20 years, the accumulating rent risks
tend to dominate the effect of 1/(1-δN), causing the demand for homeownership to increase with N.
The horizon N in equation (1) interacts multiplicatively with the volatility of rents σ2. As
noted above, as rent volatility increases, the riskiness of renting and owning both increase. The
sign of the net effect depends on the household’s horizon, and the magnitude of the net effect also
depends on σ2, which amplifies the difference between the two tenure options. That is, in a city
with low rent volatility, a household that prefers owning because it has a long expected horizon in
its house prefers it by less than an otherwise identical household living in a high rent volatility city.
We highlight this interaction effect because, in providing empirical support for the model, we will
focus on the interaction of rent volatility with horizon, Nσ2. This will allow us to isolate the effects
of rent risk from other factors that might also generate a relationship between the demand for
homeownership and either N or σ2 separately.
The degree of risk-aversion α also enters equation (1) multiplicatively. As α increases, the
effects of rent volatility and horizon grow in magnitude. Households that are more risk-averse, or

16

Analogously, fixed moving/transactions costs would reduce P0, ceteris paribus, according to the present value of the
costs, again to compensate homeowners.
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equivalently households that take on larger effective housing gambles, should be more sensitive to
rent risk given their horizons.
This analysis suggests that the aggregate wealth effect from house price fluctuations is
likely to be relatively small. Equation (1) implies that, absent changes in risk premia or discount
rates, increases in house prices reflect a commensurate increase in the present value of expected
future rents, which increases the cost of fulfilling households’ short position in housing services.
For homeowners with infinite horizons, this increase in effective liabilities would exactly offset the
increase in the house value (their long position), leaving their effective expected net worth
unchanged. Even for homeowners with finite horizons, every housing transaction is just a transfer
between a buyer and a seller. That is, a higher house price may raise the net worth of a current
owner, but the household who will purchase that house faces an offsetting reduction in net worth.
If the propensity to consume out of wealth is similar on average across buyers and sellers, then any
resulting wealth effects from house price fluctuations would tend to wash out. For this reason,
absent liquidity and collateral constraints, one would expect to find relatively small effects of
changes in housing wealth on aggregate consumption.17 This might help explain why studies of the
propensity to consume out of housing wealth find smaller effects at the aggregate level than at the
micro level.18
At the household level, the model shows why homeownership is not as risky as often
assumed. In fact, if houses did not outlast their owners, owning would be completely riskless. If
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Indeed, bringing renters back into the picture can potentially reverse the usual logic regarding wealth effects.
Consider an increase in house prices that is due to an increase in expected future rents. Renters (either current renters or
future renters depending on the timing of the rent increases) would experience a negative wealth effect due to the
increased housing costs. So it is possible for aggregate consumption to decline at the same time that house prices rise,
especially if the asset-price effect on the buying and selling households is approximately a wash. In concurrent
research, Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer (2003) find small aggregate welfare consequences of a change in house prices,
even if households adjust their consumption in response. However, if otherwise constrained households are able to
borrow against their housing equity, then increases in house prices can increase aggregate consumption.
18
See Case, Quigley and Shiller (2003) and Skinner (1996).

16

their residence spells were infinite, households would purchase a house for the known market price
P0 and never sell. Even with finite horizons, in a dynastic setting in which households pass on the
house for their descendents to live in, the effective horizon in the house would again be infinite.19
In these cases, since utility is determined by the housing service flow rather than by the house
price, unrealized house price fluctuations impose no cost on the household.20 The house would
provide a perfect hedge against rent risk. This hedge would come at the cost of a larger ex ante
price (equation (1) with N=∞).
In contrast, with finite horizons houses must be sold at the end of life, which leads to asset
price risk ex post. In that case the value of avoiding the rent risk net of the asset price risk is
appropriately capitalized into the initial purchase price of the house so as to make the representative
household indifferent ex ante between owning and renting. Of course, households’ residence spells
are often shorter than their remaining lifetimes because households move. In the next subsection,
we show that this asset price risk from moving can be small.

Multiple Locations and Residence Spells
To show the implications of housing costs being correlated across locations and over time,
we extend the model to accommodate moving and multiple residence spells in different locations.
Unlike at the end-of-life in the one-location model, when a household moves it purchases another

19

Even if a household sells its house at death, if it bequeaths the proceeds to its descendents and they use the
inheritance to buy another house in the same or correlated market, the effective horizon is again longer. Conversely, if
a household does not care about the sale price of its house, perhaps because it does not have time to consume against
this value before its death, the house price risk can be irrelevant even with a finite horizon.
20
This analysis neglects the role of housing as collateral. If the house were a mechanism for borrowing, declines in
house prices could potentially reduce a household’s welfare even if its horizon is infinite. In that case, the household
would trade off rent risk net of the collateral-induced asset price risk against the sale price risk, so the same trade-off
arguments apply. For a general discussion of liquidity constraints, see Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990), and Jappelli et
al. (1998).
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house, which introduces additional asset price risk but also corresponding cross-sectional and intertemporal hedges, which work to offset this risk.
To extend the original, one-location model to incorporate these factors in the simplest
possible way, consider just two locations, labeled A and B. Households live in A for N years and
then move to B and live there for N more years, after which they die. Location B can be interpreted
as the rest of the country, an amalgamation of the many locations to which a household could
possibly move. To simplify, we assume that households decide at birth in year 0 either to be
homeowners, owning in A and then B, or to be renters, in A and then B, and they do not adjust the
quantity of housing services when they move.21 Suppose that the spot rent processes in the two
locations follow correlated AR(1) processes: rt A = µ A + ϕrt −A1 + k (η tA + ρη tB ) and
rt B = µ B + ϕrt B−1 + k ( ρη tA + η tB ) , where ηA and ηB are independently distributed IID(0,σ2A) and
IID(0,σ2B). ρ parameterizes the cross-sectional correlation in housing costs across the two
locations, which in our framework is naturally modeled as correlation in the spot rents. If ρ=0 the
rents, and endogenously the house prices, in A and B are independent; if ρ=1 they are perfectly
correlated. To control the total magnitude of housing shocks incurred as ρ varies, the scaling
constant k can be set to 1/(1+ρ2)1/2. 22

21

The choice and timing of the move is assumed to be exogenous: the household moves to B with certainty after N
years, and knows this from the start of year 0. Allowing for interior probabilities of moving, at various times to various
locations, would unduly complicate the model without changing qualitatively the points we would like to make. We
note, however, that in the presence of transactions costs, the possibility of being (exogenously) forced to move out of
an owned house earlier than expected is an important additional risk associated with owning; whereas renting probably
provides more flexibility to adjust to shocks. On the other hand, allowing for endogenous moving could help reduce the
risks of both renting and owning, as households can move to a location with lower housing costs.
22
The (conditional) variance of rents in A is VA = Et-1(rtA)2 = k2(σA2 + ρ2σB2), and similarly the variance of rents in B is
VB = k2(σB2 + ρ2σA2). In the symmetric case with σA2 = σB2 = σ2, using k=1/(1+ρ2)1/2 implies that VA = VB = σ2, a
constant independent of ρ. Also in the symmetric case, the (conditional) correlation between rents rtA and rtB is
2ρ/(1+ρ2), which monotonically increases in [0,1] with ρ.
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The (ex post) utility of being a homeowner, again discounting all values back to year 0, is

(

(

)

)

~
~
~
now U O = U W − P0A + δ N PNA − PNB + δ 2 N P2BN , where the move takes place in year N. The initial

purchase price P0A in A is observed, but the future sale price PNA in A and the purchase and sale
prices PNB and P2NB in B are unknown as of year 0 and so impose asset price risk. The utility of
being a renter depends on the discounted cost of rents paid in A and then B,
N −1
2 N −1


U R = U W − r0A − ∑ δ t ~
rt A − ∑ δ t ~
rt B  .
t =1
t=N



Suppose that in equilibrium house prices adjust to leave households ex ante indifferent
between owning and renting, with E0 UO = E0 UR.23 The equilibrium price P0A in A will be
forward-looking, taking into account the subsequent move to B. One can show that P0A will be a
function of the expected present value of rents in A, plus the net risk premium for renting versus
owning in A and B (π RAB − π OAB ) , less the discounted risk premium for renting versus owning in B

(π RB − π OB ) that is embedded in house prices in B:
P0 = PV (r0 , µ A ) +
A

A

(π RAB − π OAB ) − δ N (π RB − π OB )
1−δ N

(6)

Our discussion will focus on π OAB , the risk of being a homeowner in A and B. We will only briefly
discuss the other terms, since they are analogous to terms in the one-location case above.
The PV(rA, µA) term has the same form as equation (2), now applied to the rent process in
location A. The risk premium for renting in A and B, π RAB , is analogous to equation (3), but now

23

We assume a stationary, overlapping generations structure: the next generation is born N years later. The new buyers
buy the house in location A from the previous generation, then N years after that buy the house in location B. Whether
a household owned or rented in location A, once it gets to location B, the equilibrium price in B is assumed to leave it
indifferent between owning and renting in B, as in the one-location case. Generalizing the timing of the one-location
case above, PNA and PNB are assumed to be determined when rNA and rNB are observed at the start of period N, and P2NB
is determined when r2NB is observed at the start of period 2N.
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reflects all of the rent shocks η1A to η2N-1A and η1B to η2N-1B that are avoided by owning.24 The
“embedded” risk premium δ N (π RB − π OB ) reflects the fact that when the household purchases a
house in A, it knows that it will subsequently pay price PNB when it moves to B, and that PNB will
include a net risk premium for the net housing risk avoided by owning while in B, as in the onelocation analysis. For instance, if the net risk premium in B is positive, raising the cost PNB of
buying the second house, to compensate households will lower the price P0A they are willing to pay
for the first house. Since the household spends its final N years in location B, the risk premia π RB
and π OB take the same form as equations (3) and (4) for a single residence spell of length N, but
their effective rent variance is now σ = k2( σ B2 + ρ 2σ A2 ), reflecting the spill-over of the shocks from
A into B depending on the correlation ρ. In equation (6) these embedded risk premia are
additionally discounted by δN since PNB is paid in period N.
The risk of being a homeowner, π OAB , extends the one-location analysis to include the
additional asset-price risk from moving and having multiple residence spells:
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Inside the curly brackets the first summation multiplying σ2B (and σ2A respectively),
N

N −1

i =1

i =1

∑ ϕ 2( N −i ) = 1 + ∑ ϕ 2i , captures the effects of the early shocks η1B to ηNB (and η1A to ηNA) on all
three prices PNA, PNB and P2NB, depending on the persistence ϕ of the shocks (as in equation (4))

24

While the renter lives in A only in years 1 to N-1, when ρ>0 the later location-A shocks ηNA to η2N-1A spill over into
the rents rNB to r2N-1B that the renter faces in location B. Similarly, the earlier location-B shocks η1B to ηN-1B spill over
into the rents r1A to rN-1A the renter faces in location A.
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and now also on their cross-sectional correlation ρ. Similarly, the second summation
2N

N −1

i = N +1

i =1

∑ ϕ 2( 2 N −i ) = 1 + ∑ ϕ 2i captures the effects of the late shocks ηN+1B to η2NB (and ηN+1A to η2NA) on

P2NB. The key new hedging effects are reflected in the terms in square brackets: HB =

[ρ − (1 − δ

N

ϕ N )] and HA = [1 − ρ (1 − δ N ϕ N )] , where the ρ-1 and 1-ρ terms reflect a cross2

2

sectional hedge, and the (1 − δ N ϕ N ) terms an intertemporal hedge.
Focusing first on the intertemporal hedge, when housing costs in A and B are completely

[

]

2

uncorrelated, with ρ=0, then HB = (1 − δ N ϕ N ) . While the shocks η1B to ηNB lead to uncertainty
in the purchase price PNB in period N, if ϕ>0 this uncertainty is partially offset by their oppositely
signed effect on the subsequent sale price P2NB of the same house, which is discounted by an
additional δN since the sale takes place N periods later. If prices in B turn out to be high when the
household buys in year N, the sale price in year 2N would also be expected to be high, dampening
the effect on the overall cost of owning. The value of this intertemporal hedge increases with the
persistence of rents. If rents are serially uncorrelated, with ϕ=0, there is no intertemporal hedge and

HB = 1. If rents are a random walk, with ϕ=1, but for discounting (and the drift µ) the sale price
would in expectation exactly offset the purchase price, reducing the amount of asset price risk, with

[

]

2

HB declining to (1 − δ N ) . Also, when ρ=0 then HA = 1, reflecting just the effects of the locationA shocks η1A to ηNA on PNA, since these shocks would not spillover into prices in location B.
By contrast, turning to the cross-sectional hedge, if housing costs in A and B are perfectly

[

]

2

correlated, with ρ=1, then HB = HA= (δ N ϕ N ) . Notice that the effects of the rent shocks on PNA
and PNB have canceled each other out (as the ρ-1 and 1-ρ terms canceled), leaving only the lagged
effects on P2NB if the shocks are persistent (ϕ>0). This occurs because, when the household sells its
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original house in A, it immediately purchases the new house in B. If rents in the two locations are
perfectly correlated, this transaction is a wash sale, providing a cross-sectional hedge akin to
moving within a local housing market with common prices. On the other hand, once PNB washes
out it is no longer serving as an intertemporal hedge with P2NB. Nonetheless one can show that, in
the symmetric case with k = 1/(1+ρ2)1/2 and σ2B = σ2A, π OAB is on balance smaller with ρ=1 than
with ρ=0, and as a result P0A is larger with ρ=1. The cross-sectional correlation in house prices
reduces the net risk of owning, justifying higher house prices, ceteris paribus.
This analysis assumed that households do not adjust the size of their housing consumption
bundles on moving. If we allowed such adjustments, house price fluctuations could actually
increase owners’ utility. Consider, in a partial equilibrium setting without adjustment costs, the
consumption bundles that a household could choose if house prices fluctuate, using a revealed
preference argument. If house prices rise, an infinitely-lived household could stay in its existing
house and maintain its original level of utility. Or, it could sell its appreciated house, purchase a
smaller house, and use the remaining proceeds to consume more non-housing goods, if doing so
makes it better off. Conversely, if house prices fall, the household could stay in the existing house
and maintain its original level of utility, or substitute toward housing by consuming fewer nonhousing goods and buying a bigger house. In either case, by revealed preference, the household is
no worse off and might be better off.25
While this analysis of multiple locations is stylized, it illustrates some of the key ways that
moving and multiple residence spells affect the risk of home owning and renting. In sum, when
housing costs are perfectly correlated cross-sectionally, house-to-house moves do not generate any
asset price risk at the time of the move, which effectively extends the homeowners’ horizons. The

25

We thank Ed Glaeser for this example.
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risk from moving increases as housing costs in the two locations become less correlated. However,
even a move to an uncorrelated location is not as risky as it might initially seem because
fluctuations in the future purchase price are partially offset by the subsequent future sale price,
insofar as housing shocks are persistent over time. On the other hand, even a move to a perfectly
correlated location entails some asset price risk if the subsequent sale is not also a wash. (In the
case of a bequest at death, there will still be asset price risk if the descendants live in an
uncorrelated market.) In any case, house prices and the demand for home owning still generally
vary with households’ expected horizon in a house and local rent risk.

II.

Data and variable construction

To test the implications of the model described in section I, we need rent and house price
data at the market level and data on homeownership and demographic characteristics at the
household level. To this end we combine four data sets.
We obtained an index of median apartment rents by MSA from Reis, a commercial real
estate information company.26 The index runs annually from 1981 to 1998, with 47 MSAs
observed consistently throughout the sample. Rents are converted to real dollars using the CPI
excluding shelter. In light of the available sample period, we measure expected rent growth for an
MSA in a given year as the average annual growth rate in rents over the preceding nine years.
Similarly the rent variance (σ2r) for each MSA-year is the variance in the MSA’s de-trended log
rents over the prior nine years.27 We use the log of rent to keep MSAs with high rent levels from
having artificially high rent variances.

26

Reis collects its data from surveys of owners of “Class A,” or top-quality, apartment buildings in each MSA.
Specifically, the growth rate of rent is defined as the average change in log rent over the prior nine-year period. Rent
variance is then computed using the within-MSA annual differences between the actual log rent and the calculated
average growth rate, and thus is expressed as a percentage of the base rent. Using rent variance to measure rent risk is

27
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House price growth is computed in a similar manner for each MSA-year using the Freddie
Mac repeat-sales house price index over the same nine-year moving windows. To obtain the level
of house prices in a given year, we inflate the MSA’s median house price from the 1990 Census by
the corresponding growth rate from the Freddie Mac index and convert to real dollars using the CPI
excluding shelter. When we estimate the effect of rent variance on the house price-to-rent ratio, we
merge the rent and house price data sets by MSA, yielding 44 MSA-level observations per year.28
Due to the nine-year windows over which we estimate rent variance, and the fact that we will
always use the one-year lagged rent variance in the analysis, we can estimate rent variance for the
1990-1999 period. This leaves us with 396 MSA-year observations.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on MSA rents and prices. Rent risk is quite substantial.
Between 1990 and 1998, the mean (across and within MSAs) standard deviation of real rent was
2.9 percent per year. This is over half of the size of the standard deviation of real house prices,
which averaged 4.6 percent over the same period. The variability in rents dwarfed real rent growth:
between 1990 and 1998 real rents grew only one-tenth of one percent on average per year. Real
house price growth, as well, was approximately zero. The average price-to-rent ratio is 15.7, so
homeowners typically pay nearly 16 times the MSA’s annual median apartment rent for their
houses, though this figure varies considerably across MSAs.29
Most of the sample means are fairly constant over time, exhibiting little difference between
the 1990-1998 averages in the first panel of table 1 and the values for 1998 alone in the second
panel. For instance, the standard deviation of the rent volatilities is 0.017 for 1990-98 and 0.012
analogous to using income variance to measure income risk, as is done in studies of the effects of income risk on
portfolio choice [e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000)].
28
Of the 47 MSAs with rent data, three do not have matching house price data.
29
Part of the reason that owner-occupied housing commands such a large multiple to rent is that the median house
price reflects a greater quantity of (or, equivalently, “nicer”) housing than the median apartment rent does. As long as
the difference between the amount of housing in the median house and in the median apartment does not spuriously
vary across MSAs over time in a way that is correlated with rent variance, it will not affect our estimation.
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for 1998. This implies that much of the variation in the data comes from cross-sectional differences
across the 44 MSAs rather than from changes over time. In particular, rent risk varies significantly
across MSAs, with the volatility of rent ranging from 1.4 percent standard deviation in Fort
Lauderdale to 7.2 percent in Austin. In 1998 the rent risks were even larger relative to the house
price risks, compared to earlier in the decade: the average standard deviation of real rent in 1998
was 2.3 percent and that of real house prices was 2.8 percent.
Homeownership rates and individual level data are obtained from the 1990 and 1999 CPS
March Annual Demographic Supplements.30 The CPS reports whether households own or rent
their residences as well as a number of demographic variables such as age, race, education,
occupation, marital status, and total household income.31 In addition, we impute the probability of a
household’s staying in the same residence (whether rented or owned) for another year as the
proportion of households in the same age-occupation-marital status cell (excluding the household
in question) in that year that did not move in the previous year.32 This probability of staying,
P(STAYS), will form our proxy for the expected horizon (length of stay in the residence) N, with a
high probability of staying corresponding to a high N.33
The sample averages of the key CPS variables are reported in table 2. In particular, during
the sample period 60 percent of the CPS households lived in an owner-occupied house. There is
considerable cross-sectional variation in the homeownership rate, especially considering the fact
30

The 1990 and 1999 years divide our rent data into two periods with nine annual observations each. By using these
two years, our estimated rent variances (which are based on nine-year rolling windows) will each be generated from a
non-overlapping set of underlying rent data.
31
We start with more than 110,000 CPS households across both years together. Nearly 70,000 households are dropped
because they do not live in one of our 44 MSAs with rent and price data. Approximately 500 more are discarded
because the household head is under the age of 25, or they have missing income or mobility information, yielding a net
sample size of 40,274 households.
32
For the imputation, we use the entire CPS sample of households, excluding those with heads under the age of 25 or
in the military. We form cells, by year, with households within one of seven 10-year age brackets (25-34, 35-44, 4554,55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85-94), 16 occupations (the CPS’s “major occupation” code), and seven marital statuses
(the CPS marital status definitions). As is customary, we use the age and occupation of the household head.
33
We obtain slightly stronger results below if we impose a different functional form and compute N as
1/(1−P(STAYS)), instead of as P(STAYS).
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that the national average homeownership rate has changed by only 4 percentage points in the last
20 years, from 65 to 69 percent. While 81 percent of households in Richmond own their house,
only 33 percent of those in New York City and 53 percent of those in San Jose do.
The last two columns of table 2 report the means for the top and bottom halves of the
distributions of the respective variables. This division corresponds to how we will group the data
in our empirical work. For example, on average 84 percent of the CPS households did not move in
the last year. However, 25 percent (= 1−0.749) of the “mover” households – those below the
median in the imputed probability of not moving – moved in the last year, while only 6.4 percent (=
1–0.936) of the “stayer” households – those above the median – moved. In the next row, the
market-level rent data is matched to each CPS observation based on its MSA of residence.
Households who live in “high” rent variance markets have a standard deviation of real rent of 4
percent, twice that of those in “low” rent variance markets.

III.

Empirical methodology and results

This section empirically examines the hypothesis that the demand for home owning varies
with net rent risk. The model in section I assumed a representative agent and perfectly inelastic
housing supply. In that case house prices would fully capitalize the net rent risk premium, leaving
all households indifferent between owning and renting. In a more realistic setting with households
of different horizons, we need to distinguish between effects that vary across housing markets and
those that affect households within markets. At the MSA level, house prices would capitalize the
net rent risk premium of the marginal homebuyer. If the marginal homebuyer in a given market has
an intermediate horizon such that the rent risk and asset price risk offset each other, the average
effect of net rent risk on the demand for owning at the MSA level might be small (assuming the
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average household in the data in the market has a similar horizon as the marginal household). If by
contrast the marginal homebuyer has a long horizon, then the demand for owning is more likely to
increase on average with rent risk. Whether this effect shows up in house prices or homeownership
rates (or both) depends on the elasticity of supply of owned houses.34 If supply is relatively elastic
(e.g. if new housing units can easily be built, or rental units readily converted to owned
condominiums and vice versa), then empirically some of the cross-MSA differences in housing
demand due to net rent risk would show up in the homeownership rate, but they might not show up
in the price of housing. On the other hand, if supply is relatively inelastic, MSA-average net rent
risk would show up in the price but possibly not in the homeownership rate. Empirically we will
find the latter to be the case.
Independent of any cross-MSA effect, within an MSA, households with a relatively large
net exposure to rent risk, in particular households with long expected horizons, should be more
likely to own. Since house prices in a market are set by the horizon of the marginal home buyer,
households that have a longer horizon than this would find the rent insurance benefit of owning to
be relatively attractively priced: By owning they would receive insurance against a larger number
of rent risks than the marginal household, and their asset price risk would be more heavily
discounted, even though they would pay the same house price premium. Conversely, households
with a shorter horizon would receive a smaller rent insurance benefit for the same premium,
making owning relatively unattractive. This within-city difference in the tendency to rent versus
own should be greatest in high rent-volatility cities, since the magnitude of net risk is proportional
to the rent volatility.

34

The literature has not come to a consensus regarding the elasticity of housing supply. Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999)
and Sinai (1998) find that supply is relatively elastic while Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996) argue that it is
perfectly inelastic. Glaeser and Gyourko (2004) point out that when demand falls, at least, supply is inelastic because
houses are durable.
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In this section, we will empirically examine the effect of net rent risk on both the
probability of homeownership and the house price-to-rent ratio. Starting with homeownership
rates, we first test whether households with exogenously longer expected horizons (“stayers”) are
more likely to own in high rent variance places than in low rent variance places, relative to
households with short horizons (“movers”). Put another way, does the difference in
homeownership rates between households who have long horizons versus short horizons increase
with rent variance? We will separately control for the levels of expected horizon (N) and MSAlevel rent variance (σ2r), and focus on their interaction term (Nσ2r). This will minimize any bias due
to omitted heterogeneity along either the horizon or MSA dimensions separately. For example, the
demand for home owning will tend to increase with the horizon N both because of the rent-risk
mechanism of interest here and because of fixed moving/transactions costs associated with buying
and selling a house. A household with a shorter horizon in a given location will be less likely to
own, in order to avoid the fixed costs. While the model does not formally include transactions
costs, our empirical control for horizon will control for all horizon effects, including the number of
rent risks incurred and any fixed transactions costs. Since these transactions costs are unlikely to
vary systematically with the volatility of rents, the interaction term should reflect only the rent-risk
mechanism.
Our second test will focus on the elderly in particular. We will examine whether the
difference in the probability of homeownership between elderly households in high and low rent
variance markets decreases as the households get older and thus their expected remaining horizon
in their residence declines.
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Third, we investigate whether households which may be more sensitive to rent risk because
average local housing costs comprise a larger share of their budget are more likely to be
homeowners in high rent variance markets than in low rent variance markets.
Turning to house prices, we examine the effect of rent variance on the price-to-rent ratio at
the MSA level. In markets where rent variance is greater we would expect to see a larger price-torent ratio, reflecting the additional value of the rent insurance benefit of homeownership above and
beyond the expected present value of the housing service flow. To deal with unobserved MSAlevel heterogeneity, we will also look at within-MSA changes in rent variance over time.

III.1

The effect of rent risk on homeownership rates
We begin by estimating probit models of the following form using household level data

from the 1990 and 1999 CPS:

OWN i ,k ,t = β 0 + β 1 f (σ r ) k ,t + β 2 g ( P ( STAYS )) i ,t + β 3 f (σ r ) × g ( P ( STAYS )) i ,k ,t
+ θX i + ψ Z k , t + ζ t + ε i , k , t

(8)

where i indexes the household, k the MSA it lives in, and t the year. OWN is an indicator variable
that takes the value one if the household owns its house and zero otherwise. As explained above,
equation (8) has separate controls for both the volatility of rent and the household’s expected
horizon, as well as the interaction of these two variables. The standard deviation of rent in market k
is denoted by σr,k and is computed over the 1980-1989 period for the 1990 observations and over
1990-1998 for the 1999 observations. β1 captures the effect of net rent risk on homeownership for
the average household in each MSA. P(STAYS)i,t is the imputed probability that household i does
not move during year t, and is our proxy for the horizon N. Our analysis suggests that the
probability of owning should increase with horizon and so with P(STAYS), leading to a positive

29

sign for the coefficient β2. However, since other unmeasured factors such as transactions costs can
work in the same direction, we will not draw strong inferences from the estimates of β2.
The more compelling test of the rent insurance benefit of owning focuses on β3 and the
interaction of rent risk and expected horizon, f(σr) * g(P(STAYS))i,k,t in equation (8). The
difference in the probability of home owning between longer and shorter expected horizon
households is expected to increase with the rent variance, so β3 is expected to be positive. In
addition, while unobserved MSA level characteristics could potentially bias the estimated
coefficient β1 on the standard deviation of rent, the estimated β3 should still be consistent since it
depends only on the interaction of household level characteristics with the MSA-level rent
variance. In effect, we are comparing the homeownership probabilities of long- and short-horizon
households within each MSA, and in some specifications we add MSA x year fixed effects to make
that comparison even more explicit. Thus, in order to affect our results any MSA-level
unobservable characteristics would need to influence the homeownership decision for long- and
short-horizon households differentially in each MSA, and that differential impact would have to
vary across MSAs in a way that happened to be correlated with the rent variance. We believe this
to be unlikely.
Xi is a vector of household level controls from the CPS including log income and dummy
variables for race, education, occupation, 10-year age categories, and marital status.35 MSA-level
controls in the vector Zk,t include the average rent and median house price in the preceding year,
and the average real rent growth and house price growth rates over the preceding nine years. A
dummy for 1999 is included to control for the year-specific factors ζt. For robustness we will

35

We can separately control for marital status, age, and occupation, even while including the probability of staying,
since the latter is imputed using the interaction of marital status, age, and occupation rather than the levels of the
individual variables.
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consider various functional-form transformations of the standard deviation of rent, denoted by f(⋅),
and of the probability of staying, denoted by g(⋅). Since a number of the independent variables,
including the standard deviation of rent, vary only across markets within a given year, we correct
the standard errors to account for the correlated shocks within MSA x year cells (unless we directly
include MSA x year dummies).
Table 3 starts by estimating the average effect of rent risk on the probability of home
owning, restricting β3 to be zero and estimating β1. The most straightforward method is to compare
the probability of home owning for households in high rent variance locations versus that for
households in low rent variance locations. Thus in the first three columns of table 3, f(σr)k,t is an
indicator variable that is equal to one when σr,k,t is greater than the median standard deviation of
rents, which is about 0.027.
Overall, in column 1 the average household in a high rent variance MSA is only slightly
more likely to be a homeowner than one that lives in a low rent variance MSA, by β1 = 2.8
percentage points. However this effect is not statistically significant (the standard error is 2.4
percentage points). As discussed above, this cross-MSA result could reflect a relatively inelastic
supply of owned housing, in which case we would expect to see the average effect of net rent risk
instead capitalized into house prices (below). Or, the result could mean that the rent and asset price
risks largely offset each other for our sample households with average expected horizons in their
respective MSAs, in which case there would be little average effect in either ownership rates or
prices.
Households with long expected horizons are more likely to be homeowners. In the first
three columns of table 3, g(P(STAYS)) equals one for households above the median imputed
probability of staying and zero otherwise. In column 1 the estimated coefficient β2 implies that
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households with the longest horizons, or “stayers”, are 3.6 percentage points more likely to own
their homes than are “movers.” Of course, this result could partly reflect transaction costs or other
omitted variables that are correlated with horizon.
Column 2 of table 3 reports the results from estimating the full equation (3), now including
β3. The interaction term is set to one if the household both lives in an MSA with a standard
deviation of rent above the median and also is above the median in expected horizon. The resulting
estimate of β3 is 0.042 (0.014), and is statistically significant. Thus, relative to the difference
between “movers” and “stayers” in low rent variance MSAs, “stayers” in high rent variance MSAs
are 4.2 percentage points more likely to own their home than “movers” in the same places. For
comparison, based on the estimate of β1, the shorter horizon households (who have an average
imputed probability of staying of about 75 percent, or an expected horizon of about four years) are
less than one percentage point more likely to own their home if they live in a high rent variance
MSA. These results support the hypothesis that, even controlling for MSA characteristics like
average house prices and rents, the rent insurance aspect of home owning significantly increases
the demand for homeownership for households whose horizons are long enough for the rent risk to
outweigh the house price risk.36
Since the horizon/rent-variance interaction term is a combination household/MSA-level
effect, we can control for all unobserved MSA characteristics and still identify β3. For that
purpose, in column 3 we include dummies for each MSA in each year, at the expense of not
identifying purely MSA-level characteristics such as the average effect of the standard deviation of
rent. Unlike the previous column which made use of the cross sectional variation in rent risk and
homeownership rates between MSAs, this strategy uses only the variation from differences in
36

These results are basically unchanged, and still statistically significant, when interactions between the probability of
staying and all the observable MSA characteristics (and the year dummy) are included as controls.
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homeownership between movers and stayers within MSAs. Although the estimated coefficient β3
on the interaction term declines in magnitude to 2.9 (1.1) percentage points, it remains significant.37
Columns 4 to 6 of table 3 impose a different functional form on the standard deviation of
rent and the probability of staying. Instead of using an indicator variable for whether a variable is
above some threshold, we include each variable linearly. The interaction term is simply the
product σr * P(STAYS). In the third row of column 5, the estimated coefficient β3 on the
interaction term is 8.08 (2.77) and is statistically significant. The last row of table 3 translates this
coefficient into an economically more meaningful number by multiplying it by the standard
deviation of the interaction term, 0.011 (table 2). This value can be interpreted as a measure of the
exposure to rent risk. The rent insurance benefit of home owning has a large effect on the
homeownership rate: a one standard deviation increase in the interaction term, starting at its mean,
would increase the probability of homeownership by 9.2 percentage points. Relative to a baseline
value of 65 percent, this represents an economically significant effect. When we substitute MSA
dummies for the MSA-level covariates, in column 6, the estimated coefficient β3 declines slightly
to 6.10 (1.77), but remains significant.
The estimated coefficients β1 on the standard deviation of rent σr are consistent with the
predictions of the model. In column 5, β1 is negative and significant at -6.29 (2.17), indicating that
for the shortest horizon households, the asset price risk outweighs the rent risk, reducing the
demand for owning. However, given the positive coefficient β3 on the interaction term, if the
expected horizon is greater than 4.5 years (1/(1–6.29/8.08)), the rent risk dominates the asset price
risk. This is the case for almost 75 percent of our sample. In sum, the results of this subsection
37

These and subsequent conclusions persist if we also control directly for house price risk; i.e., the standard deviation
of house prices computed analogously to rent risk. However, as section I highlights, house price risk is just an
endogenous function of rent risk. Our analysis, following equation (1), appropriately captures the net effect of both
risks.
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indicate that net rent risk significantly affects the demand for owner-occupied housing, with the
effect increasing in magnitude with households’ horizons, consistent with the analysis of section
I.38

III.2 Rent risk and housing demand by the elderly
The value of homeownership as rent insurance may provide a partial explanation for why
homeownership rates are high among the “younger” elderly and decline as the elderly become
increasingly old. One reason that the (younger) elderly might be more likely to own than younger
households is that, as is often assumed, the elderly might be more risk-averse, and so would place a
higher value on avoiding net rent risk.39 The model implies that the subsequent decline in
homeownership with age could be due to the effect of expected horizon (N) on the net rent risk.
For the elderly, their expected remaining lifetime is a reasonable proxy for their expected horizon
in their home. Hence as they approach the end of their lives, they expect to face fewer rent shocks,
which reduces the benefit of owning in terms of avoiding rent risk, and their asset price risk is
much closer at hand. (The asset price risk might be especially salient if they want to bequeath the
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One implication of the two-location model is that moving to a correlated housing market leads to less asset price risk
than moving to an uncorrelated market, since the transaction at the time will be closer to a wash. As long as some
fraction of the moves in our data are to at least partially uncorrelated housing markets, our measure of expected
mobility captures the potential asset price risk. To check this assumption, we imputed the probability of moving
locally and to non-local housing markets. The CPS reports whether a move was within the same county, so we
designated within-county moves as local. We used them to compute P(STAYS,local), employing an analogous
imputation procedure as for computing P(STAYS) for moving in general. (Though to reflect the fact that differences in
the likelihood of local and non-local moves vary by group within MSA, we used MSAs rather than occupations in the
imputation cells.) While we do not know which counties households might move to, on average out-of-county moves
are more likely to yield lower correlations in housing costs, so we used them to compute P(STAYS, non-local). We
included P(STAYS,local) and P(STAYS,non-local) and each of their interactions with σr as explanatory variables in
equation (8). While for brevity we do not report the results, the coefficient on the interaction of rent variance with
P(STAYS,non-local) is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction with P(STAYS,local) is
indistinguishable from zero. These results persist even in the presence of MSA x year dummies, and are consistent
with section I.
39
This assumes that the younger elderly have a long enough remaining horizon such that the net risk premium starts
positive. Note that young households do not necessarily have longer expected horizons in their residences (N) than the
younger elderly, since horizon and remaining lifetime do not coincide as closely for the young.
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monetary proceeds from selling their home at death to their children). Thus even if the younger
elderly are relatively likely to own (a level effect), we expect to find that their probability of
owning should decline as they approach the end of their lifetime (a slope effect).
While one could attribute a rising-then-falling age-profile of homeownership to the rent
insurance benefit of owning, there are many other possible explanations. For example, low
mobility among the younger elderly might explain their higher homeownership rates, and declining
health that requires nursing-home care might cause them to be more likely to move out as they
further age. However, a unique prediction of our model is that the age-profile effects due to the
rent insurance mechanism should be magnified by the volatility of rents. For instance, risk
aversion-induced homeownership by the (younger) elderly, as well as the difference in
homeownership rates between them and younger households, should be greatest in high rent
variance places, since the value of the rent insurance would be largest there. Also, the decline in
the probability of homeownership with age should be steepest in high rent variance locations, since
the insurance benefit (which increases with the interaction term σ2r × N) is more sensitive there to
the expected horizon. Other mechanisms affecting the age-ownership profile are unlikely to be
systematically different in high and low rent volatility MSAs. Thus we will focus our attention on
how the slope of the age profile of homeownership varies with rent volatility.40
The effects of rent volatility can be directly seen in the unconditional homeownership rates
by age. Using the pooled 1990 and 1999 CPS cross-sections, we divided our 44 MSAs into highand low-variance markets depending upon whether they were in the top quartile of rent variance or
40

We do not expect differences in the level of homeownership to be very well-identified in the cross-section, so we
will concentrate on differences in the slope of the age profile. For example, as the elderly approach the end of life,
assuming they value the terminal value of their house (perhaps due to the aforementioned bequest motive), the net rent
risk could become negative if the asset price risk outweighs the few remaining rent risks. In that case, the older elderly
in high rent volatility places would be more likely to be renters than those in low rent volatility MSAs, ceteris paribus.
That negative relationship is a result of those households in high rent volatility MSAs having experienced a more rapid
decline in their rate of homeownership. This difference in slope is less likely to be contaminated by MSA heterogeneity
than is the level of homeownership.
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below the median, and used a kernel regression to compute the unconditional homeownership rate
by age in both sets of markets.41 The result is presented in figure 1. By age 40, homeownership
rates are about 3 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent variance
MSAs. The difference grows with age and peaks for people in their early 60s, with 60-year-olds
exhibiting homeownership rates of 76 percent in high rent variance MSAs and 72 percent in low
rent variance MSAs (the level effect). While the unconditional probability of homeownership
declines with age starting in the late 60s, it does indeed fall faster for people in high rent variance
MSAs (the slope effect), consistent with the rent insurance mechanism. By the time people are in
their late 70s, with presumably short expected remaining lifetimes, the probabilities of
homeownership in high- and low-rent variance MSAs have converged to approximately the same
level.
While figure 1 presents unconditional homeownership rates by age, we would like to
control for other observable factors that may vary systematically by age or with rent variance. We
test these hypotheses with a more parametric specification by estimating the following spline
equation using a probit model:

OWN i ,k ,t = γ 0 + γ 1 AGE × UNDER60 i + γ 2 OVER60 i + γ 3 AGE × OVER60 i + γ 4 f (σ r ) k ,t +

γ 5 AGE × UNDER60 × f (σ r ) i ,k ,t + γ 6 OVER60 × f (σ r ) i ,k ,t + γ 7 AGE × OVER60 × f (σ r ) i ,k ,t +

(9)

θX i + ψZ k ,t + ζ t + ε i ,k ,t
where AGE is the age in years of the head of the household, UNDER60 is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one if the head is 60 years old or younger, OVER60 is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one if the head is more than 60 years old. In some specifications, f(σr)k,t is a
dummy variable that equals one if MSA k in year t is in the top quartile of rent variance and zero
otherwise. In other specifications, it is the standard deviation of rent entered linearly. The terms
41

Given the relatively small number of elderly in the data, this section emphasizes the top quartile of rent variance in
order to make its points more starkly. The results are qualitatively similar using the top 50 percent.
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that are not interacted with f(σr)k,t (those with coefficients γ0 to γ3) correspond to the dashed line in
figure 1 (low rent variance). The terms that are interacted (γ4 to γ7) measure the differences in level
and slope between the solid line in figure 1 (high rent variance) and the dashed line. The hypothesis
that the younger elderly are in general more risk averse concerning rent volatility implies that γ6
should be positive (the level effect). Further, if the age-ownership profile is more steeply declining
in high volatility MSAs, γ7 should be negative (the slope effect). Once again, the specification
includes detailed household controls Xi for income, year, race, education, occupation, expected
mobility, and marital status, as well as MSA x year dummies.
The results appear in table 4. The most direct test of the rent insurance mechanism focuses
on just the elderly, and thus column 1 uses only those households where the respondent is over the
age of 60. By including MSA x year effects, we are comparing the slopes of the post-60 agehomeownership profile in high and low rent variance MSAs but are controlling for differing levels
of homeownership across MSAs and over time. The results are consistent with the rent insurance
mechanism. Most notably, γ7 is significantly negative, implying that homeownership declines more
rapidly with age in high rent variance MSAs. Relative to people over 60 in low rent variance
MSAs, the probability of homeownership for people over 60 in high rent variance MSAs falls by
0.29 (0.14) percentage points more per year of age. This is a considerable difference because,
controlling for other covariates, the probability of homeownership for people over 60 in low rent
variance MSAs is nearly constant over their remaining lifetimes.
In column 2, we include in the sample households of all ages and constrain the coefficients
on the covariates to be the same for the entire sample. We again include MSA x year fixed effects.
As a baseline, based on γ1, households aged 60 or below in low rent variance MSAs (in the bottom
three quartiles) have a probability of homeownership that increases at a rate of 1.4 percentage
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points per year. In high rent variance MSAs (the top quartile), the probability of homeownership
rises by γ5 = 0.16 (0.07) percentage points faster than this per year, so that by age 60 households are
γ6 = 10.4 (3.3) percentage points more likely to be homeowners than people of the same age in low
rent variance MSAs. Thus homeownership among the younger elderly rises with rent volatility. We
find virtually the same relative effect for over-60 households as we did before: since γ7 is
significantly negative, the probability of homeownership declines more rapidly with age for
households in high rent variance MSAs.42
These results are generally robust to specification changes. The last two columns in table 4
instead parameterize rent variance as a continuous linear function. We obtain similar qualitative
effects as in the previous columns, although the interaction of rent variance with age-over-60 (γ7) is
no longer statistically significant.43

III.3 Rent risk and the market rent-to-income ratio
Households for whom housing is a larger portion of their budgets or wealth might be more
sensitive to net rent risk since they are implicitly taking a larger gamble, and so might be
effectively more risk averse. We test this “budget share” hypothesis by dividing the sample based
on the ratio of the average rent in the MSA to actual household income. We use MSA-level rent
instead of the household’s own rent since the former is exogenous to the household and is defined

42

The only notable difference between columns 1 and 2 is that in column 2 households over age 60 in low rent
variance places have homeownership rates that increase with age (γ3). This result is an artifact of not allowing an
MSA/year-specific over-60 intercept, as we did in column 1, and constraining the effects of the covariates to be the
same for young and old households. This is why we place our emphasis on the difference in slopes between high and
low rent variance places, which is better identified than the slopes themselves.

43

We have also estimated a quadratic age profile of homeownership, and allowed this profile to be different in highand low-variance MSAs. Again, younger elderly in high rent variance MSAs have a higher overall probability of
homeownership, but still exhibit a steeper decline with age, with the differences being statistically significant. We
have also replaced the “over 60” indicator with an indicator variable for the household’s head being retired, with
similar qualitative results.
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even for homeowners. Households that live in markets where rents are high relative to their own
incomes would generally need to spend more of their budget on housing to obtain the same housing
service flow relative to households that live in low rent markets.
The average effect of the rent-to-income ratio interacted with rent volatility on the
probability of homeownership is uncertain, since the effect depends on whether rent risk or house
price risk dominates for the average household. However, we expect that the demand for owning
would still increase with horizon more rapidly for high market rent-to-income households. Further,
homeownership rates should be highest among those with high rent-to-income ratios, long expected
horizons, and high rent risk (i.e., interacting all three terms). As before, we estimate a probit model
on household level data from the 1990 and 1999 CPS:

OWN i ,k ,t = ρ 0 + ρ1 f (σ r ) k ,t + ρ 2 h( r Y ) i ,k ,t + ρ 3 f (σ r ) × h( r Y ) i ,k ,t + ρ 4 g ( P ( STAYS ))i ,t
+ ρ 5 g ( P ( STAYS )) × h( r Y ) i ,k ,t + ρ 6 f (σ r ) × g ( P ( STAYS )) i ,k ,t

(10)

+ ρ 7 f (σ r ) × g ( P ( STAYS )) × h( r Y ) i ,k ,t + θX i + ψZ k ,t + ζ t + ε i ,k ,t
where r/Y is the MSA-rent to household-income ratio. The other variables are defined as in the
previous subsections. As before, we will estimate two specifications. First, we estimate a
discretized specification where high rent variance and “stayer” households are defined relative to
their respective medians, and high rent-to-income households are those in the top quartile.44
Second, we let each of the variables enter linearly.45 All regressions include the usual household

44

This cutoff roughly corresponds to households for whom average rents equal a third of their annual incomes. That is
the budget allocation to housing typically recommended by financial planners.
45
For this specification we symmetrically trim the top and bottom one percent of the rent-to-income distribution since
households with zero or very low values for income appear to have very high rent-to-income ratios and so could
potentially skew the results. This sampling reduces our number of observations to 39,468 from 40,274 households.
Predictably, this sampling has virtually no effect on any of the estimated coefficients in the discretized specification in
columns 1 and 2. It also has little effect on the triple-interaction term in columns 4 and 6, but reduces the magnitude of
the rent-to-income level and double-interaction terms.
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controls, and MSA x year dummies which again subsume the uninteracted rent variance
coefficients ρ1.
The results are reported in table 5. In column 1, we estimate the differential effect of rent
variance and horizon on high and low market rent-to-income households. The results are
consistent with the budget-share hypothesis. First, according to the estimate for ρ5, stayers who are
in the high rent-to-income group are 4.4 percentage points more likely to be homeowners than
movers in that group, relative to the difference in probability of homeownership between stayers
and movers with low rent-to-income ratios. Second, the estimated ρ6 implies the same result as in
table 3: households with longer horizons are more sensitive to rent risk. Stayers in high rent
variance areas are 3.2 percentage points more likely to be homeowners than are movers, relative to
stayers and movers in low rent variance areas. Both of these estimated coefficients ρ5 and ρ6 are
statistically significant. Also, households who live in markets where rent-to-income ratios are in
the top quartile are ρ2 = 3.5 percentage points less likely to own their homes than households with
low ratios.
In column 2 of table 5, we test the triple-interaction effect (N x σr × r/Y): Are the highest
homeownership rates exhibited by households in high rent volatility MSAs, with long expected
horizons, and with high market rent-to-income ratios? Indeed, that is what we find. Such
households are ρ7 = 5.4 percentage points more likely to be homeowners, a statistically significant
effect. This triple-interaction specification controls for unobserved differences between movers and
stayers, high rent variance MSAs and low variance MSAs, and high rent-to-income and low rentto-income households. It even allows for unobserved differences within the corresponding binary
interactions: moving/staying and rent variance, rent variance and rent-to-income, and
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moving/staying and rent-to-income. The MSA x year effects control for unobserved MSA-level
characteristics that change over time.
In columns 3 through 6, we use different functional forms of the key variables to
demonstrate the robustness of the results. In columns 3 and 4, we continue to use an indicator
variable for high and low rent-to-income households but now let the standard deviation of rent and
the probability of staying enter linearly. Since rent/income can be quite high for households with
very low income, using a dummy for r/Y reduces the impact of the measurement error. In column
3, the significant results are that homeownership increases with expected horizon (N), and with the
sensitivity to rent risk (N*σr). These results are consistent with those in table 3. In column 4, we
still find that rent risk increases the likelihood of homeownership most for households who expect
to be in their houses longer (N*σr). This effect is increasingly pronounced as the rent-to-income
ratio increases: in the last row, the estimated coefficient on the triple-interaction term is ρ7 =9.4
(4.4). Columns 5 and 6, which also enter rent-to-income linearly, produce qualitatively similar
results, though the statistical significance of the triple interaction term in column 6 is diminished.

III.4 The effect of rent risk on the price-to-rent ratio
In this subsection we look for effects of the rent-insurance demand for home owning on
house prices. We estimate the following equation in MSA-level panel data using OLS:
P
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(6)

where (P/r)k,t is the price-to-rent ratio in MSA k in year t, σr,k,t is its standard deviation of rent, and
Zk,t is its growth rate of real rent. Since the rent rk,t in the denominator of the dependent variable
controls for the overall demand for living space, the rent insurance value of ownership should show
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up as a larger price-to-rent ratio (assuming the supply of owner-occupied housing is not fully
elastic). That is, using the ratio of prices to rents controls for shocks to the overall housing market,
which impact both owner-occupied housing and rental housing. Just as a price-earnings ratio for
stocks should be higher for firms with higher expected future earnings growth, P/r should be higher
for MSAs with higher expected future rent growth. Controlling for the growth rate of rent, the
coefficient κ1 on the standard deviation of rent will then capture the net rent risk premium
associated with net rent risk, as discussed in section I. Differences over time that are common to
all MSAs are controlled for using the year dummies ζt.
We estimate this model on the panel of 44 MSAs observed over the 1990-1998 time period.
For each year t=1990-1998, we calculate real rent variance and growth over the prior (rolling) nineyear period. For example, for 1990 σr,k and rent growth are calculated over 1981-1989, and for
1998 they are calculated over 1989-1997.
Table 6 reports the results. We find consistent evidence that the rent insurance benefit of
owner-occupied housing is capitalized into larger price-to-rent ratios. Column 1 of table 6 presents
the results from the pooled cross section, without MSA fixed effects. First, the price-to-rent ratio
significantly increases with real rent growth, with an estimated coefficient of 69.0 (14.7). Hence
house prices capitalize future rents, as expected. Also as expected, MSAs with more volatile rents
have a significantly greater price-to-rent ratio, with the estimated coefficient κ1 being 34.5 (11.9).
The last row of table 6 helps to gauge the economic significance of this result. A one standard
deviation increase in σr,k,t is estimated to increase the price-to-rent ratio by 0.62. Since the mean
price-to-rent ratio is 15.7, this amounts to a 3.9 percent rise in house prices, holding rents constant,
which is a sizable effect. Thus, house prices appear to incorporate both expected future rents and
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the associated risk premia, consistent with the model in section I, and more generally with assetpricing models of other, financial assets.
We next incorporate MSA fixed effects to control for all MSA-level characteristics that do
not change over time. Since the specification also includes year dummies, we are using the withinMSA variation in rent volatility, rent growth, and the price-to-rent ratio over time to identify the
rent insurance mechanism. (Recall that the rent variance σr,k,t and (rent growth)k,t within an MSA
change over time as the rolling window over which we compute them moves.) However, the MSA
dummies remove a potentially powerful source of variation in rent variance, average differences
across MSAs.46
Even controlling for MSA and year fixed effects, in column 2 we find that when rent
variance in a given MSA is larger, the price-to-rent ratio is in fact higher. The estimated coefficient
κ1 = 11.0 (5.6) implies that a one standard deviation increase in σr,k,t leads to a 0.20 increase in the
price-to-rent ratio (last row). Although smaller than in the previous column, this still implies a 1.3
percent increase in house prices (from the base P/r ratio of 15.7) for a given rent level, and is
statistically significant. The smaller magnitude is not surprising considering that only within-MSA
variation is being used for identification. Rent growth also continues to have the expected positive
effect on P/r, with an estimated coefficient of 16.7 (4.7). In column 3, we account for MSA level
heterogeneity by estimating equation (4) in first differences. This specification emphasizes new
information that arrives over time, since the difference in the computed rent variance between one
year and the previous year is due to adding the most recent year of data and discarding the oldest
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Note that one would not expect to find as strong of an effect of rent variance on the probability of home owning
within MSAs over time, since homeownership and housing construction are slow to respond to changes in rent
variance. However, since prices adjust more readily, changes in rent variance should be more quickly incorporated into
prices and thus be more easily detectable in the data on price-to-rent ratios.
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year in the rolling window used to calculate σr. The results are almost identical to those in column
2, although more precisely measured, with the estimated coefficient κ1 being 10.1 (3.8).47
Overall, these results show that at least some of the rent insurance benefits of
homeownership are capitalized into local price-to-rent ratios, even for the average household.
These results are consistent with the model in section I, assuming that the supply of owned housing
is at least partially inelastic, and suggest that the net rent risk premium is positive for our sample
households with average expected horizons in their respective MSAs.

IV.

Conclusion

Since every household needs to obtain housing services somehow, house price risk and rent
risk cannot be studied in isolation. One frequently overlooked but important benefit to
homeownership is the insurance that it provides against the risk of fluctuations in future rent
payments. Homeownership provides a guaranteed level of housing services for a fixed up-front
cost. In contrast, renters purchase housing services on the risky spot rent market. While
homeownership provides a hedge against this rent risk, it is itself risky because owners eventually
move or die and thus face asset price risk at the time of sale. However, this asset price risk is lower
than conventionally assumed. In particular, it is smaller for households with longer effective
horizons in their homes – either because they plan to live there a long time, or they will move
within the same housing market or to a correlated market, or they will bequeath their homes to
heirs who plan to live in the same or correlated housing markets. In addition, fluctuations in house
prices generally reflect changes in the present value of future rents, and so in the costs of fulfilling
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These results persist even when we separately control for the standard deviation of house prices, even though, as
noted above, it is an endogenous function of rent variance in our framework.
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households’ short positions in housing. This reduces the aggregate wealth effects from house price
fluctuations.
We presented a simple model of tenure choice with endogenous house prices and both rent
risk and house price risk. The demand for homeownership increases with rent risk, given house
price risk. Even with endogenous house prices, such that house price risk increases with rent risk,
demand still increases on net with rent risk for people with long enough expected horizons. These
people avoid a greater number of rent risks by owning, and their future asset price risk is more
heavily discounted. Thus the model suggests that the insurance demand for homeownership will
increase on net with households’ expected horizon, and with the interaction of horizon with rent
risk.
We tested these implications by investigating the effect of rent volatility on the probability
of home owning and on house prices. We controlled for MSA-level heterogeneity and other factors
by comparing households that should be differentially affected by rent variance only because they
have different expected horizons in their residences. This isolated the effect of rent risk from other
factors that influence homeownership, including transactions costs and other factors correlated with
horizon or rent variance separately. Notably, we found that households with longer horizons are
indeed more likely to own in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent variance MSAs, relative to
households with shorter horizons, as suggested by the model. A one standard deviation increase in
the exposure to rent risk (expected horizon interacted with the standard deviation of rent) is
estimated to lead to a 7 to 9 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate. Also consistent
with the model, the younger elderly are particularly sensitive to rent risk, with people aged 60
residing in MSAs with a top-quartile rent variance being over 10 percentage points more likely to
be homeowners than people of the same age in low rent variance MSAs. Confirming that this
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effect is due to rent risk, the probability of homeownership drops most rapidly with age for elderly
who live in high rent variance MSAs, consistent with the rent insurance benefit declining with their
expected horizon. Also, households for whom market rents are high relative to their incomes
respond the most to rent risk, especially if their expected horizon is large.
We also found evidence that some of the insurance demand for home owning shows up in
the multiple of rents people are willing to pay for houses. Even controlling for MSA-level fixed
effects, we found that when MSAs have higher rent variance their house prices are larger relative to
the rental value of the housing stock. That is, house prices reflect not only expected future rents,
but also the associated rent-risk premia, consistent with asset-pricing models of financial assets.
These results have a number of implications for housing markets and other decisions for
which housing wealth is important, in addition to the aggregate wealth effect already discussed.
The rent insurance benefit of owning appears to be a significant factor in the demand for
homeownership. For comparison, a typical cross-sectional estimate of the user cost elasticity of
owning implies that a one standard deviation increase in user cost would lead to about a 2.5
percentage point rise in the homeownership rate. The estimated effect in table 3 of a one standard
deviation increase in the effective rent variance is about three times larger.
Another way to gauge the economic significance of the results is to calculate how much
rent risk contributes to homeownership rates and house prices overall. Using our estimates from
the fifth column of table 3, we computed the effect of eliminating rent variance altogether (relative
to its actual level) on the predicted probability of homeownership. For the 75 percent of our
sample households with the longest expected horizons, the likelihood of homeownership would
significantly decrease in the absence of rent variance, on average by 3.3 percent, as the net rent risk
avoided by owning is eliminated. For the remaining households, who have short horizons, the
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probability of homeownership would increase by as much as 10 percent if rent risk were
eliminated, since for them the asset price risk dominates the rent risk. The effect of rent risk on
house prices, computed from our estimates in table 6, also is large. Using the smaller estimates
from the second column, if there were no rent risk then house prices relative to rents would decline
by 2.3 percent on average and by as much as 7 percent in some MSAs.
For older households, the rent insurance aspect of home owning may help explain why the
elderly avoid becoming renters and why, if they do, they usually do so very late in life. Because
they highly value the insurance against rent risk, it is more costly for the younger elderly to become
renters than previous analyses have assumed. But as the elderly further age, the asset price risk of
owning can eventually dominate the risk from renting, making them increasingly likely to become
renters late in life. These findings underscore the need for viable reverse mortgage markets to
enable households to avoid both rent and asset price risk by continuing to own their houses while
annuitizing their housing wealth. To date, these markets have not been particularly successful
[Caplin (2001)]. In their absence, one should not simply assume that the housing wealth of the
elderly is available for consumption.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for MSA-level data
1990-1998
Mean
Std. Dev.

1998 only
Mean
Std. Dev.

Standard deviation
of real rent

0.029

0.017

0.023

0.012

Standard deviation of real
house price

0.046

0.031

0.028

0.016

Real rent growth

0.001

0.019

0.002

0.013

Real house price growth

0.006

0.031

-0.001

0.021

Average real rent

6,331

1,505

6,748

1,607

Median real house
price

102,773

49,841

107,527

48,415

Price-to-rent ratio

15.72

4.08

15.52

3.57

Variable

Number of observations

396

44

Notes: The first panel reports the average for all MSAs over the 1990-1998 time period. The
second panel reports the average across the 44 MSAs in 1998 only. The standard deviations of rent
and house prices, rent growth, and house price growth are all computed over the preceding nine
years. The rent data are obtained from Reis. House price growth is computed from the Freddie
Mac repeat sales house price index. To compute the level of house prices, the MSA median house
price from the 1990 Census is inflated to the current year using the Freddie Mac index. All dollar
values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter.

51

Table 2: Summary statistics for CPS data (1990 and 1999)

Mean if below the
median

Mean if above the
median

0.116

0.749

0.936

0.031

0.013

0.021

0.040

0.026

0.011

Mean

Standard Deviation

Proportion owning

0.600

0.490

Proportion not moving
(actual P(STAYS))

0.843

0.363

Proportion not moving
(imputed P(STAYS))

0.843

Standard deviation of real rent
Probability of not moving x standard
deviation of real rent

Notes: Number of household-level observations is 40,274 from the 1990 and 1999 CPS. Rent variances are computed over the 19801989 and 1990-1998 time periods. The rent data are obtained from Reis. Not moving is defined as having not moved in the preceding
year.
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Table 3: The effect of net rent risk on the probability of homeownership

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Indicator variables for
high rent variance and
high probability of staying
Standard deviation of
real rent (σr) [β1]

0.028
(0.024)

0.008
(0.022)

Probability of staying
P(STAYS): (N) [β2]

0.036
(0.011)

0.015
(0.013)

0.020
(0.011)

0.042
(0.014)

0.029
(0.011)

P(STAYS) x s.d. of
real rent (N × σr) [β3]

(5)

(6)

Continuous variables
0.339
(0.686)

-6.285
(2.174)

0.652
(0.070)

0.395
(0.095)

0.448
(0.081)

8.081
(2.771)

6.100
(1.772)

MSA controls

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

MSA x year dummies

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Household controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R-squared

0.2352

0.2355

0.2498

0.2371

0.2375

0.2520

0.092
(0.032)

0.069
(0.020)

A one standard
deviation in staying x
σr leads to…

Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions of equation (3)
estimated on 40,274 households in 44 MSAs in 1990 and 1999. The dependent variable takes the
value of one if the household is a homeowner. All specifications include year dummies. MSA
controls include median real rent, median real house price, real rent growth, and real house price
growth. Household controls include log household income and dummies for the head’s occupation,
age, race, education, and marital status. MSAs are deemed to have high rent variance if σr is above
the median household’s value of 2.8 percent. The probability of staying is high if the household is
above the median probability of 88 percent. All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by
the CPI less shelter. For specifications that do not include MSA x year dummies, the standard
errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for correlation within MSA/year.
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Table 4: Net rent risk and homeownership by the elderly

(1)

(2)

Indicator variable for
high rent variance

(3)

(4)

Continuous rent variance

Age if 60 or below [γ1]

0.0141
(0.0005)

0.0086
(0.0009)

Age if 60 or below × σr [γ5]

0.0016
(0.0007)

0.056
(0.025)

Age > 60 dummy [γ2]

0.557
(0.010)

0.414
(0.029)

Age > 60 dummy × σr [γ6]

0.104
(0.033)

3.598
(1.303)

Age if over 60 [γ3]

-0.0006
(0.0007)

0.0019
(0.0009)

-0.0006
(0.0016)

0.002
(0.002)

Age if over 60 × σr [γ7]

-0.0029
(0.0014)

-0.0035
(0.0017)

-0.0559
(0.0495)

-0.066
(0.059)

MSA x year dummies:

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Household controls:

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Age >60

All

Age >60

All

Number of observations:

9,699

40,274

9,699

40,274

R-squared

0.1989

0.2526

0.1992

0.2550

Sample:

Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions estimated on 40,274
households in 44 MSAs in 1990 and 1999. The coefficients in brackets correspond to equation (4).
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the household is a homeowner. All specifications
include MSA x year dummies. Household controls include log household income, probability of
not moving, and dummies for the head’s occupation, race, education, and marital status. MSAs are
deemed to have high rent variance if σr is above the 75th percentile household’s value of 4.1
percent. All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter.
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Table 5: Net rent risk and the market rent-to-income ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

Indicator variables for
high rent variance, high
probability of staying, and
high market rent-to-income

(4)

Indicator variables for
high market rent-to-income
and continuous rent variance
and probability of staying

(5)

(6)

Continuous variables

Probability of staying
(N) [ρ4]

0.011
(0.011)

0.018
(0.012)

0.436
(0.084)

0.503
(0.090)

0.498
(0.086)

0.562
(0.099)

Market Rent / Household Income
(r/Y) [ρ2]

-0.035
(0.015)

-0.018
(0.016)

-0.034
(0.056)

0.202
(0.109)

0.217
(0.058)

0.377
(0.135)

Standard deviation of real rent x
market rent/income (σr × r/Y) [ρ3]

0.010
(0.013)

-0.021
(0.020)

0.170
(0.515)

-7.849
(3.766)

0.710
(0.558)

-4.565
(4.075)

P(STAYS) x market rent/income
(N × r/Y) [ρ5]

0.044
(0.013)

0.017
(0.019)

0.026
(0.060)

-0.267
(0.148)

-0.154
(0.063)

-0.343
(0.157)

P(STAYS) x standard deviation of real
rent (N × σr) [ρ6]
P(STAYS) x s.d. of real rent x
market rent/income (N × σr × r/Y) [ρ7]

0.032
(0.011)

0.018
(0.013)

6.761
(1.822)

4.643
(2.064)

6.470
(1.805)

4.377
(2.408)

Pseudo R-squared

0.2565

0.054
(0.025)
0.2566

6.264
(4.788)

9.433
(4.381)
0.2585

0.2586

0.2598

0.2599

Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions of equation (5) estimated on 39,468 households in 44
MSAs in 1990 and 1999. Out of the original sample of 40,274 households, the observations with the one percent highest and lowest
values of market average rent/income r/Y are excluded from the regression. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the
household is a homeowner. All specifications include MSA x year dummies and a full set of household controls including log
household income and dummies for the head’s occupation, age, race, education, and marital status. MSAs are deemed to have high
rent variance if σr is above the median household’s value of 2.7 percent. The probability of staying is high if the household is above
the median probability of 88 percent. All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter.
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Table 6: The effect of net rent risk on the price-to-rent ratio
(1)

(2)

(3)

Standard deviation of
real rent (σr)

34.52
(11.88)

11.04
(5.55)

10.10
(3.81)

Real rent growth

68.99
(14.68)

16.73
(4.67)

18.14
(5.23)

Controls for MSA fixed
effects?

No

MSA
dummies

First
differences

Number of observations

396

396

352

R-squared

0.0486

0.9471

0.1609

A one standard deviation
increase in σr leads to…

0.62
(0.21)

0.20
(0.10)

0.18
(0.07)

Notes: Dependent variable is the price-to-rent ratio. Estimation is by OLS, following equation (6).
Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations equals 44 MSAs per year over the 19901998 time period. All specifications include year dummies. σr and real growth rates are computed
based on the previous (rolling) nine years. A one standard deviation increase in σr is 0.018 (from a
mean of 0.031). The average price-to-rent ratio is 15.72.

56

Figure 1: Kernel-Smoothed Age Profile of Homeownership, by Rent Variance
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